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Article 8

RECENT CASE NOTES
for-d, 56 Miss. 552; Humeston v. Cherry, 23 Hun 141; Morgan v. Kidder,
55 Vt. 367. In other jurisdictions, however, the rule has been adopted that
a return of the payments made or notes given is a condition precedent to a
recovery of the property. American Soda Fountain Co. v. Dean Drug Co.,
136 Iowa 312, 111 N. W. 534; Ketchum v. Brennan, 53 Miss. 596; Shafer
v,. Rassell, 28 Utah 444, 79 P. 559; Segrist v. Crabtree, 131 U. S. 287. Of
course, the right to retain the amounts paid may depend upon express stipulation; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Treadway, 4 Ill. App. 57; and on the other hand
the contract may preclude a forfeiture of payment by stipulating that the
vendor may recover the property and reasonable charges. Fairbanks v.
Malloy, 16 Ill. App. 277. So too, it has been held that the seller may retain
such amount as will compensate him for any deterioration of the goods in
the hands of the buyer. Commercial Pub. Co. v. Campbell PrintingPress,
etc. Co., 111 Ga. 388, 36 S. E. 756. The settled rule in Indiana is, that in
the absence of a forfeiture clause either express or implied, by virtue of
which all prior payments are to be retained by the vendor as liquidated
damages, upon retaking the property, he must account to the vendee for the
payments made to him. Quality Clothes Shop v. Keeney, supra. Where a
note is not included within the conditional terms of a contract of sale, but is
given as the equivalent of cash for a preliminary payment, its consideration
does not iail by reason of the recaption of the property by the vendor upon
the vendee's default, and the vendor may still enforce it.
Norman v.
Meeker, 91 Wash. 534, 158 Pac. 78, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 462; Randall v.
Chaney, supra. Here, however, the conditional provisions of the sale contract were inserted in the note, and no mistake is alleged or reformation
sought. The note in suit being part of the original conditional agreement,
and the consideration having failed therefor, the general rule prevails, and
it follows that the vendor cannot recover on the note.
K. J. M.
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-CONSENT-Officers sent to search
D.'s home for intoxicating liquor read search warrant to D.'s wife, who
said "COME RIGHT IN.
You are welcome to search here. You will not
find anything." Search warrant invalid. HELD: Such language did not
constitute an invitation to search, nor a waiver of D.'s constitutional right
against unlawful search and seizure. State v. Connor, 167 N. E. 545. Case
is in accord with Meno v. State, 197 Ind. 16, in holding that one acquiescing
to search under a warrant is merely yielding to legal coercion, resistance to
which is an offense against the state, and does not thereby consent to the
search. Accord: State v. Owens, 259 S. W. 100 (Ky.) ; State v. Lock, 259
S. W. 116 (Mo.); Hahpden v. State, 252 S. W 1007 (Tenn).
Failure to object to officers' search held not consent in U. S. v. Olmstead,
7 Fed. (2nd) 760, and yielding to a show of force is not consent, Amos v.
U. S., 255 U. S. 313; but see Gallendon v. U. S., 5 Fed. (2nd) 673, assent
under a threat to procure a search warrant held good consent. Owner of
property, in reply to a show of a search warrant said "All right. Go ahead.
You won't find anything." Held to constitute waiver as a matter of law.
State v,. Uotila, 71 Mont. 351. Accord, Gray v. Commonwealth, 749 S. W.
769; Smith v. McDuffee, 72 Ore. 286; State v. Luna, 266 S. W. 755 (Mo.).
Perhaps the best rule is, where there is a conflict of facts as to alleged
waiver, to submit the question to the jury under proper instructions. People v. Forman, 188 N. W. 375 (Mich.).
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Concerning the ability of wife to consent for husband (not decided in
the principal case), cases holding squarely that wife cannot consent, Polowick v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 843; Veal v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 643;
Carigano v. Commonwealth, 238 Pac. 507 (Okla.). An agent was not allowed to consent for his principal in Tri-State Coal and Coke Co., 253 Fed.
605. But a mother can consent for her son in Kentucky, Gray v. Commonwealth, supra, and consent by wife was upheld in Smith v. MeDuffee, supra,
and State v. Luna, supra. Indiana will probably follow the Kentucky rule
J. S. G.
if the question is ever presented.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-JURISDICTION RESULTING FROm BUSINESS DONE

WITHIN STATE-Respondent purchased a through coupon ticket at the office
of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company in New Orleans, which entitled him to passage over the line of the Louisville & Nashville from New
Orleans to Montgomery, Ala., over the Atlanta & West Point R. R. from
Montgomery to Atlanta, Ga., and thence to Washington over the line of the
Southern Railway Co., petitioner. The train was made up by the Louisville
& Nashville in New Orleans and was operated under an agreement among
the three carriers concerned, which was not offered in evidence. But it
appeared that the cars composing the train were furnished by the three
carriers on the basis of their respective mileage; that each fu rnished locomotive power-and train crews over its own line; and that each, while in
possession of the train, was in exclusive control of it.
Respondent took passage in New Orleans on a car of the Southern and
proceeded in it on his journey until, while on the line of the Southern in
Virginia, he was injured, due to alleged negligence of petitioner.
The Southern was a Virginia corporation, which had complied with the
Louisiana statute by designating an agent to accept service of process within that state.
A tort action was brought by the respondent in the District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana. Process against petitioner was accordingly served upon its agent in Louisiana. The Southern, appearing specially before answer, excepted to the jurisdiction on the ground that the
cause of action, which was transitory, arose outside of Louisiana and not
out of any business done within that state. The exception was overruled.
Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, October 15, 1928.
The Supreme Court (although reversing the decision of the District
Court upon other grounds) upheld its position in overruling the petitioner's
exception to its jurisdiction. The grounds for the Supreme Court's decision
were (1) Petitioner was sufficiently present within the state of Louisiana
for the purpose of being sued upon a cause of action arising within the state.
(9) This cause of action was one connected with a contract for transportation, as evidenced by the ticket sold to respondent in New Orleans, by petitioner's agent, the Louisville and Nashville Ry. Co. "It was out of this
action within the state that the present obligation of the Southern arose,
although the alleged breach of it occurred elsewhere." Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Chatters; Southern Ry. Co. et al. v. Same, 49 Supreme
Court Reporter, 329, April 15, 1929.
If the liability of a railway carrier of passengers for a negligent injury
to a passenger may be considered to be of a dual nature, i. e., a liability in
tort, and a liability for breach of the contract of carriage, then the position

